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Abstract
Authorities in the People’s Republic of China communicate with citizens using an esti-
mated 600,000 Sina Weibo microblogs. This study reports on a study of Chinese
citizens’ adoption of microblogs to interact with the government. Adoption results
from trust and peer pressure in smaller-network ties (densely knit, pervasive social net-
works surrounding individual citizens). Larger-network ties (trust in institutions at large,
such as the Chinese Communist Party, executive organizations, the judicial system, the
media, etc.) are not associated with the adoption of microblogging. Furthermore,
higher levels of anxiety are correlated with lower levels of use intention, and this finding
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underlines the impact of the Chinese authority’s surveillance and control activities on
the lives of individual Chinese citizens. Based on these findings, we outline a theory of
why citizens use microblogs to interact with the government and suggest avenues for
further research into microblogs, state–citizen communication patterns and technology
adoption.
Points for practitioners
Our research identifies trust in individual civil servants, citizens’ anxiety and peer
pressure as drivers of Chinese citizens’ intentions to use the Weibo microblogging
platform to interact with the Chinese government. This insight allows practitioners
to better understand citizens’ drivers and obstacles in the use of social media in state–
citizen relations in China.
Keywords
adoption, China, diffusion, microblogging, Sina Weibo, social media, trust in
government
Introduction
The government of China is an avid user of microblogs (Ma, 2014; Schlæger and
Jiang, 2014). In this context, microblogs refer to social-networking services like
Sina Weibo, Tencent, People’s Net and Xinhua Net, through which users – indi-
viduals, businesses and government agencies alike – can post, share and comment
upon messages that are limited to 140 characters, pictures or videos. Academic
literatures have extensively researched the motivations of Chinese officials, agen-
cies and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Harwit, 2014; Ma, 2014; Meng
et al., 2017; Schlaeger and Jiang, 2014) to use the estimated 600,000 government
and CCP microblogs (Qin, Str€omberg, and Wu, 2017), as well as authorities’
practices to regulate and control communication on microblogs (Harwitt, 2014;
King et al., 2013; Qin et al., 2017). However, Chinese citizens’ motivations and
uses have gone largely unnoticed (with Medaglia and Zhu’s (2016) study being a
notable exception). It is the express intention of our article to fill this gap and to
produce and test an explanation of Chinese citizens’ adoption of microblogs to
interact with the government. Moreover, by constructing and testing such an
explanation, it is also our ambition to reflect on how new technology-enabled
forms of interaction, deliberation and communication fit into the state–citizen
communication patterns of authoritarian governance regimes. China is an inter-
esting case in this regard because it combines an authoritarian regime with a large
user base that is described in the literature as being, on average, young, social and
outspoken (Hassid, 2012).
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The rise of Weibo microblogs in China and the response by
Chinese authorities
China’s political structure
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is governed through two interlocking
power structures: the CCP, headed by the Politbureau and its Standing
Committee; and a government apparatus headed at the national level by a premier
who presides over the State Council. The CCP–government structures parallel one
another in various administrative tiers: the central level (including autonomous
regions (of which Tibet is one) and special autonomous regions (Hong Kong and
Macau)), provinces, prefectures, counties, districts, and towns and sub-districts.
Central-level leaders are recruited from CCP cadres and appointed by higher hier-
archical echelons. Since the reforms of the 1980s, village elections and public
administrative hearings have taken place more frequently. Overall, the CCP has
emphasized the importance of the Internet for gaining insights into citizen prefer-
ences (Meng et al., 2017). While findings show a strong guiding policy from the
central government on interaction with citizens, which would suggest centraliza-
tion, we find that the pace and the methods used vary for each provincial govern-
ment (Wu and Bauer, 2010).
The rise of microblogs
China witnessed the first Internet applications in the 1980s. Initially, network
applications emphasized use in academic circles. In 2006, Chinese citizens
became aware of the American microblogging platform Twitter. Twitter was
soon accompanied by Chinese counterparts like Fanfou, Digu and Jiwai
(Harwit, 2014; Qin et al., 2017). In 2009, in response to riots in the Xinjiang
Uyghur autonomous region, the Chinese government blocked Twitter and shut
down most domestic microblogging services. In late 2009, Sina Weibo, a hybrid of
Twitter and Facebook, entered the scene and soon became the most popular plat-
form in China, with the number of users peaking at over 600 million in 2014
(Harwit, 2014), of whom 85% accessed Weibo through their mobile device
(Chiu et al., 2012; Koetse, 2015). While Sina Weibo’s user experience is mostly
comparable to Twitter, the degree of interaction is higher and more comparable
with Facebook. Weibo includes a trending topic list compiled through computer-
based user participation, as well as staff choices, which causes some items to be
distributed more than others. Furthermore, posts are censored by keyword black-
listing and manual staff monitoring, with automated filtering efforts being in place
as an auxiliary method (King et al., 2013). King, Pan and Roberts note that key-
word blocking and automated filtering methods can relatively easily be outsmarted
by using analogies and metaphors, but hand censoring is not easily evaded.
Moreover, in order for users to make full use of microblogs, they are required
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to register; hence, users who publish content deemed sensitive by the authorities
are easily identified (Harwit, 2014).
Government response to citizens using microblogs to interact with
the government
Harwit (2014) states that almost from the launch of electronic networks in the
1980s, the CCP’s Central Publicity Department and the State Council Information
Office issued directives to lower-level branches of government ordering specific
agencies to censor sensitive content and sanction perpetrators. However, in sub-
sequent years, technological opportunities (e.g. the emergence of microblogs) and
the political climate changed. Surveillance has continued to exist and is practised
by both information officers and Internet monitors at all levels of government, as
well as by censors employed by private Internet service providers (King et al.,
2013). However, since about 2011, many local authorities have also embraced
Sina Weibo as an information channel for public service announcements and as
a propaganda space. One observable behaviour is that many agencies started to
post human-interest stories and morning and afternoon general wisdom sayings
(Hao et al., 2016; Liu, 2013; Schlæger and Jiang, 2014). More importantly, since
2011, authorities have become more tolerant of ‘citizen voice’ related to local issues
such as corruption by local officials, illegal land seizures and ecological disasters.
King, Pan and Roberts (2013) provided empirical evidence suggesting that the
Chinese authorities nowadays allow a range of expressions of positive and negative
comments about the state, its policies and its leaders. Schlaeger and Jiang (2014)
reported that more and more individual local political and administrative leaders
are actively using microblogs to ‘gauge the water’ (Cairns and Carlson, 2016; Qin
et al., 2017), using technologies like Sina Weibo as a ‘beta institution’ with which
new ways to incorporate citizens’ suggestions and complaints into policies are
experimented with (Ma, 2014; Schlaeger and Jiang, 2014; Sullivan, 2014). Data
from a survey experiment conducted by Meng, Pan and Yang (2017) showed that
more than half of the surveyed administrative and political leaders are receptive to
suggestions expressed through microblog channels, but their willingness to incor-
porate citizens’ suggestions into policies (and inversely the probability that citizens
are ignored or sanctioned) depends on social contention and risk that criticism
turns into social protest (Hassid, 2012; Li et al., 2016, 2017). If the authorities find
or suspect that collective movements are in evidence, they will most likely intensify
censorship and may have officials and a so-called ‘50-cent party’ of trolls (some
trolls are paid at a piece rate of 50 fen) ‘occupy’ social media (Cairns and Carlson,
2016; Qin et al., 2017) in order to prevent social protests from gaining traction
(Cai, 2010; Cairns and Carlson, 2016; Qin et al., 2017). Sullivan (2014) notes that
possibly the biggest fear of the Chinese authorities is the emergence of a coalition
of laid-off workers, dispossessed homeowners, unemployed graduates, hungry
farmers and minority ethnic and religious groups that may challenge political
stability and the regime’s hold on power; if this happens, censors will attempt to
4 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)
clip the social ties of the movement rather than block media altogether (King et al.,
2013).
Adoption and diffusion of microblogs in China
Underpinnings of a theory on Chinese citizens’ adoption of microblogs
to interact with the government
The interaction of the Chinese authorities with microblogs is rather complex (Qin
et al., 2017). Microblogs are being used as a source of information through which
the authorities experiment with learning about public sentiments, and as a propa-
ganda space through which citizen discontent is contained within tolerable limits –
practices referred to as ‘consultative Leninism’ (Tsang, 2009) or ‘networked
authoritarianism’ (MacKinnon, 2011; Tsai, 2016). The literature also documents
how online discontent occasionally transforms into visible protests (Deng et al.,
2015); however, an explanation as to why relatively ordinary Chinese citizens
either do or do not adopt microblogs like Sina Weibo in their interactions with
the government is lacking. This gap is also observed in studies focusing on citizens’
social media use in Western contexts (Susanto and Goodwin, 2013; Welch and
Fulla, 2015). In the following sections, we will develop and test a theory of Chinese
citizens’ adoption of microblogs (and Sina Weibo in particular) in their interaction
with the authorities.
In the more generic technology adoption literature, frequently used starting
points are theories and models like the ‘technology acceptance model’ (TAM),
the ‘theory of reasoned action’ (TRA), the ‘motivational model’, the ‘theory of
planned behaviour’ (TPB), the combined TPB–TAM, the ‘PC utilization’ model,
‘innovation diffusion theory’ and ‘social cognitive theory’. The ‘unified theory of
acceptance and use of technology’ (UTAUT and UTAUT2) (see Venkatesh et al.,
2016) integrates many variables from the aforementioned theories into a model
that features an individual’s ‘intention to use’ as a mediator in the relation between
an individual’s actual use of a specific technology as an outcome variable and a set
of predictors like the user’s expectancy, ease of use, peer pressure, habit and the
availability of resources. UTAUT and comparable models have been used to
explain, among other things, Chinese consumers’ use of mobile commerce plat-
forms, as well as citizens’ use of government websites in a variety of national
contexts (Homburg, 2019; Yang et al., 2018). In general, the UTAUT and
UTAUT2 models are suitable for explaining the adoption of specific services
(and in an e-government context, especially electronic transactions) given, in prin-
ciple, the voluntary use of the technology or service at hand.
There are reasons, however, to question the validity of the UTAUT model
for explaining the adoption of microblogs by Chinese citizens to interact
with the government in the Chinese context. As was put forward in the
previous section, characteristic of this context is the gradual experimentation
by the Chinese authorities with receptivity towards citizens’ grievances
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(Schlaeger and Jiang’s (2014) concept of ‘beta-institutions’), which coincides with a
legacy of totalitarianism and the practice of censorship, online policing and, at times,
the physical repression of collective action. As a result, Chinese citizens can be viewed
as individually free to express themselves onmicroblogs but collectively chained (King
et al., 2013). The willingness of citizens to express their preferences undoubtedly
differs from that in a consolidate democracy (Meng et al., 2017), implying that
Chinese citizens can be expected to express circumscribed sets of preferences in the
face of the possible sanctioning of online behaviours deemed inappropriate by the
Chinese authorities. In other words, Chinese citizens can be expected to have to deal
with balancing new opportunities through which sentiments may be vented with the
risks of being confronted with censorship and prosecution.
Conceptualization and hypothesis development
Adoption: Intention to use. In our conceptualization of the adoption of microblogs by
Chinese citizens, we conceptualize adoption as the degree to which Sina Weibo is
mentally accepted by a Chinese citizen as a channel to communicate with the
government. We follow a widely used practice in adoption research by measuring
‘acceptance’ as an individual’s intention to use Sina Weibo because intentions are
more validly measured in questionnaires than behaviours are, and previous studies
have shown that intentions are adequate proxies of actual behaviours (De Lange
and Homburg, 2017). Furthermore, measuring intentions in a questionnaire to be
administered in a target population of Chinese citizens proved to be less sensitive
than measuring actual behaviours. In order to explain Chinese citizens’ adoption
of Sina Weibo to interact with the government, we hypothesized that ‘intention to
use’ Sina Weibo to interact with government is correlated with a number of var-
iables, which are discussed in more detail in the following.
Peer pressure. Peer pressure is hypothesized to impact Chinese citizens’ adoption of
Sina Weibo as CCP and government communications have emphasized the impor-
tance and relevance of Sina Weibo as a channel through which public sentiments
are to be communicated (Harwit, 2014; Qin et al., 2017). In general, adoption
theories have generally identified above-individual considerations, more specifi-
cally, conformation to the expectations of nearest and dearest people, as an impor-
tant predictor of the adoption of technology (Carter and Belanger, 2005;
Venkatesh et al., 2016a). We assume that this impact might be even more prevalent
in authoritarian systems. We therefore hypothesize that the higher the pressure to
be recognized as a user of Sina Weibo that an individual Chinese citizen perceives,
the higher the intention to use Sina Weibo to interact with the government will be.
Anxiety. A second relevant construct is a user’s perception of or belief in the falli-
bility of a specific technology that he or she is about to be using. In this study, it is
assumed that anxiety is an individual’s general negative affective emotion of
unease or arousal in the way in which one deals with technology, where unease
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and arousal are related to consequences that the citizen may be confronted with
that are beyond the control of an individual citizen (Rana et al., 2013, 2016). As
was discussed earlier, censorship, bans or prosecution may follow social media
activity deemed inappropriate by the Chinese authorities, which underlines the
relevance of anxiety as a predictor of adoption (Wang et al., 2012). We therefore
hypothesize that the higher an individual’s level of anxiety towards microblogs, the
lower the intention to use Sina Weibo to interact with the government will be.
Trust. The concept of trust is prevalent in many adoption studies, including but not
limited to studies of electronic government services (Carter and Belanger, 2005;
Venkatesh et al., 2011). The concept of trust is used in many contexts and therefore
notoriously hard to define (Frederiksen, 2014). Although anxiety and trust may be
thought of as overlapping concepts, trust is an individual’s belief that exists only in
reference to other individuals or institutions, and is therefore different from anx-
iety, defined as an individual, internalized negative affective emotion. In this study,
we conceptualize trust of a citizen A in party B as A’s notion of safety associated
with A’s expectation that B will refrain from exploiting A’s vulnerabilities in the
presence of B’s power to do so (in other words, A expects B to be reliable) (Pavlou
and Gefen, 2005). By accepting vulnerability, A possesses trust; by refraining from
exploiting vulnerability, B is trustworthy.
Trust and trustworthiness in relation to microblogs in China has at least two
meanings. Following Yang and Tang (2010), a first meaning is a sociological inter-
pretation of trust related as the degree to which citizens have positive expectations
of the motivations of administrative, legal and societal institutions, such as the
CCP, the government apparatus, councils, courts, associations, the media and
complaints bureaus. We will refer to the term institutional trust in this context
and associate this type of trust with the ties that individual citizens may have
with larger overarching societal structures (so-called larger-network ties). Hence,
an individual displays a high level of institutional trust if he or she thinks that the
authorities – at considerable physical distance, or minimally at arm’s length, from
citizens – will not negatively affect individuals’ lives, even if the authorities possess
the right and means to do so. We hypothesize that the higher an individual’s level
of institutional trust, the higher the intention to use Sina Weibo to interact with the
government will be.
Following Poppo, Zhou and Li (2016) and Reich-Graefe (2014), a second mean-
ing is that trust is relevant in interpersonal relationships. In this more psycholog-
ical connotation, trust is an expectation that other persons or officials refrain from
opportunistic behaviours. In a Chinese context, interpersonal trust is considered to
be of the utmost relevance as trust in officials protects citizens against administra-
tive hurdles or unforeseen risks. Therefore, an intricate and pervasive relational
network is a cultural phenomenon that is vital in daily life in China. This network
(guanxi) consists of feelings of empathy and solidarity (ganqing), reliability and
sincerity (renqing) and reliance (xinren) (Yen et al., 2011).
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Interpersonal trust is relevant for explaining citizens’ adoption of Sina Weibo
since there is empirical evidence that many Chinese government officials are recep-
tive to citizens’ sentiments on Sina Weibo but may respond in unfavourable ways
(i.e. engage in opportunistic behaviours) to citizens if citizens’ sentiments are per-
ceived as a threat to social order. The potential threat is personified by specific
individuals, or develops in relations with specific persons, so called smaller-
network ties. We hypothesize that the higher an individual’s level of interpersonal
trust in government officials, the higher the intention to use Sina Weibo to interact
with the government will be.
Methodology and measurement
Questionnaire design, data collection and data-screening procedures
In order to construct an explanation, a first step was to conduct a survey with
which the various variables could be measured in a sample of Chinese citizens. To
ensure the validity of the measurements as much as possible, this study adopted
and slightly modified related questions asked as Likert items in prior studies
on peer pressure (Venkatesh et al., 2011), interpersonal trust (Poppo et al., 2016;
Reich-Graefe, 2014), institutional trust (Yang and Tang, 2010), anxiety (Venkatesh
et al., 2011) and use intention (Venkatesh et al., 2012). A 71-item questionnaire
was developed in the English language, translated into Mandarin Chinese and
then translated back into English by an independent translator so that the quality
of the translation could be checked. Furthermore, the questionnaire was
piloted among various Chinese students living and working near the researchers’
domicile.
A second step involved the selection of a region within which respondents could
be targeted. Given the vast size and cultural variety that exists in China, we decided
to limit the data collection to a specific province and selected Hunan province,
located in South-Central China. Hunan, home to 68 million inhabitants (estimated
in 2017) and 41 ethnic groups, has a fairly well-developed education system,
and Hunan government institutions have shown ample experience with social
media: the city of Changsha’s CCP committee spearheaded the shaping of
online debates as early as in 2004 (Harwit, 2014), while Hunan’s High Court
and Changsha Police services received national awards from the Sina corporation
for their microblogs. This is not to say that Hunan excels in comparison with other
provinces. We aim for neither comparison nor generalization; rather, we
merely aim to demonstrate that Hunan fits the criterion of having experience
with social media.
Subsequently, as a third step, various China-based companies specializing in
marketing and opinion polling were contacted; the perceived sensitivity of the
subject matter turned out to be prohibitive for many companies to carry out the
survey. Eventually, data were gathered between 13 February and 21 February 2017
by a Shanghai-based survey company using an online survey tool.
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Data were scanned and screened for kurtosis and unengaged responses based on
standard deviations of Likert items and the time it took for respondents to com-
plete the survey (M¼ 12.6 minutes, SD¼ 24.9 minutes). Data from five respond-
ents were dropped because of distrustful characteristics (age). Ten unexpected
missing values were replaced by the median of nearby data points following gen-
eral data-screening guidelines (Gaskin, 2017). Responses from 1572 citizens from
Hunan province could be used for further analysis.
Descriptive results
Demographics
Respondents were 914 men (58%) and 658 women aged 15 to 67 (men: M ¼ 36.9,
SD ¼ 8.4; women: M¼ 34.6, SD¼ 7.0). The majority of the respondents (86%)
reported living in an urban area. Professional activities included going to school
(3%), working in the public sector (30%), working in the private sector (60%),
keeping house (3%) and something else (2%). The highest level of completed
education was reported as junior high school and below (2%), senior high
school (8%), college (37%), university (49%) and postgraduate (3%). Monthly
salary ranged as follows: less than RMB 2000 (3%), 2001–5000 RMB (23%),
5001–8000 RMB (39%), 8001–12,000 RMB (27%) and above 12,000 RMB
(6%). Table 1 shows the comparison of gender, education level and age compared
to Weibo users and the Chinese population.
While Hunan province covers a large area and holds a large population, and we
did manage to sample across various age groups, income groups and gender
groups, we cannot claim that findings do justice to regional differences, which
might exist within Hunan province, or to differences in the whole of China (see
Table 1): highly educated people and middle-aged people seem to be
Table 1. Comparison of the characteristics of the study sample, Weibo users and the total
Chinese population as regards gender, education and age.
Variable
Study sample
(n¼ 1572)
Weibo users
(Medaglia and
Zhu, 2016)
Total 2017
China populationa,b
Female 42% 49% 49%
Higher education 52% 76% 10%
Age< 24 2% 49% 29%
Age 24–33 40% 39% 16%
Age 34–45 44% 11% 15%
Age> 46 14% 2% 38%
Sources: ahttps://www.populationpyramid.net/china/2017/ (accessed 25 October 2019). bFor 2014,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, available at: http://stats.oecd.org
(accessed 6 July 2017).
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over-represented. This could be regarded as a limitation that should be explored
further in future research.
Use of social media
Almost all respondents were registered Sina Weibo users (97%), and 72% of all
respondents reported using Weibo services about once a day or more.
Organizational government Sina Weibo accounts (i.e. accounts used with reference
to civil service law, excluding accounts opened by CCP and organizational cadres)
were used by 90% of respondents. Of all respondents, 57% answered that they
used government Sina Weibo accounts at least once a week or more, with gender
(p< .001), age (p< .001), income (p< .001) and education (p< .001) affecting gov-
ernment Sina Weibo frequency of use (chi square¼ 213.164, p< .001, df¼ 10,
Nagelkerke’s R2¼ .171). Figure 1 displays the reported topics that respondents
use most (with a maximum of three options). Apparently, topics of state–citizen
interaction on Weibo cover many issues, with no clear dominance of specific areas
of discussion.
Transport
13%
Hygiene and
hospitals
12%
Weather
12%
Environmental
protecon
12%
Municipalies
11%
Educaon
11%
Judicial
8%
Business and
taxaon
6%
Investment
6%
Public security
4%
Tourism
3%
Foreign aﬀairs
2%
Figure 1. Citizen use of government Weibo, by topic area.
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Analysis and hypothesis testing
Results of the exploratory factor analysis and reliability analysis
As there is little empirical research on government-initiated social media use in
China considering interpersonal trust, institutional trust and anxiety, we carried
out an exploratory factor analysis in order to identify the underlying structure of
the measured variables in the questionnaire. First of all, the factorability of all Likert
items in the questionnaire was examined. A cross-table analysis of all items showed
that many items correlated by at least .3 with at least one other item, suggesting
factorability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .968 and
thus well above the commonly recommended value of .6, and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity was significant (v2 (1176)¼ 31145.577, p< .0001). The diagonals of the
anti-image correlation matrix were above .5, with the exception of the items on
anxiety. Finally, the communalities were all above .3, further confirming that each
item shared at least some common variance with other items. Given the aforemen-
tioned considerations, factor analysis was deemed to be suitable with all items.
Factor analysis was carried out using the maximum likelihood extraction method
since the variables were generally normally distributed. Given two potentially cor-
related trust variables, and a possibly related anxiety variable, we used oblique
rotation (which is inclusive of orthogonal rotation) to allow for possibly correlated
factors. Also, since the data set was relatively large (more than 1500 observations),
we decided to opt for Promax rotation. In the course of the factor analysis, the
inclusion of all items did not result in a simple factor structure. Only after the
elimination of items could a five-factor solution explaining 44.9% of the variance
be identified (see Table 2). Subsequently, the internal consistency of the identified
factors was measured using Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 3). All measures for con-
sistency were acceptable; no improvements could be made by dropping items from
the scales. Subsequently, composite scores were created for each of the factors based
on the mean of the items’ factor loadings greater than .3. Table 3 reports the mean
values, standard deviations and correlations between the aforementioned scales.
Multiple linear regression analysis
In order to test a basic multivariate model with one dependent variable (behav-
ioural intention) and four independent variables, we conducted a multiple linear
regression analysis. Before the actual regression was implemented, we checked the
following model assumptions for multiple regression analysis following guidelines
set out by Field (2009). Multicollinearity was checked by inspecting the correla-
tions of the independent variables in Table 3 and by inspecting the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) values of each independent variable. As none of the correlations
are above .7 and all VIFs were below 4, this assumption is met. Homoscedasticity
was checked using a scatter plot of standardized residuals and predicted values; no
anomalies were found. Independent errors were checked using the Durbin-Watson
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statistic, and the value of 1.910 revealed no problems associated with this assump-
tion. The assumption of normally distributed errors was tested via the inspection
of unstandardized residuals. Although the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality (SW ¼
.972, df¼ 1572, p< 0.01) suggested that normality was not met, inspection of the
Q-Q plot revealed a relatively normal distribution, and we concluded that this
assumption was also met.
Table 2. Results of factor analysis (maximum likelihood extraction, Promax rotation).
Behavioural
intention
Peer
pressure Anxiety
Interpersonal
trust
Institutional
trust
Q17 .667
Q18 .684
Q19 .633
Q28 .463
Q29 .485
Q30 .401
Q31 .476
Q38 .806
Q39 .878
Q40 .880
Q41 .796
Q42 .452
Q43 .589
Q44 .625
Q45 .698
Q46 .586
Q47 .590
Q48 .615
Q49 .679
Q50 .509
Q51 .557
Q52 .649
Q53 .365
Q54 .376
Q55 .430
Q56 .445
Q57 .596
Q58 .625
Q59 .569
Q60 .553
Q61 .741
Q62 .744
Q63 .609
Q64 .713
Q65 .746
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The impacts of the variables of peer pressure, anxiety, interpersonal trust and
institutional trust on behavioural intention to use social media to communicate
with the government (controlling for age and gender, as well as subsequently for
urban/rural residency, level of education and not working in the public sector)
were assessed using multiple linear regression analysis. A significant regression
equation was found for age and gender (F (2, 1569)¼ 3.645, p< 0.05;
R2¼ 0.003), age, gender, living area, level of education and working in the
public sector (F (5, 1566)¼ 6.805, p< 0.001; R2¼ 0.021), as well as for age,
gender, living area, level of education, working in the public sector, peer pressure,
anxiety, interpersonal trust and institutional trust (F (9, 1562)¼ 112.507, p< 0.001;
Table 3. Reliability, means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations of the variables.
Cronbach’s
alpha Mean (SD)
Behavioural
intention
Peer
pressure Anxiety
Interpersonal
trust
Institutional
trust
Gender (1¼ female) 0.42 –0.46 –0.03 –0.02 .022 –.138
Age 35.9 (7.9) –0.43 –0.40 –0.29 –0.07 .018
Area (1¼ urban) 0.87 –0.10 –0.10 –0.03 –0.12 –0.13
Education (1¼ university
and postgraduate)
0.52 –0.08 –0.03 0.04 –0.05 –0.09
Job (1¼ civil servant) 0.30 –0.04 –0.02 –0.09 –0.05 –0.03
Behavioural intention .708 1.68 (.55) 1
Peer pressure .762 1.96 (.63) .500 1
Anxiety .895 3.50 (1.09) –.358 –.170 1
Interpersonal trust .854 1.95 (.50) .535 .628 –.253 1
Institutional trust .891 1.88 (.51) .414 .575 –.104 .685 1
Table 4. Regression results on behavioural intention.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Beta (significance) Beta (significance) Beta (significance)
Age –0.050* –0.066* –0.055*
Gender (1¼ female) –0.053* –0.057* –0.062**
Area (1¼ urban) –0.088** –0.035
Education (1¼ university
and postgraduate)
–0.069** –0.036
Job type (1¼ civil servant) –0.025 –0.037
Anxiety –.247***
Peer pressure .247***
Interpersonal trust .279***
Institutional trust .045
DR2¼ .003 (adj) DR2¼ .018 (adj) DR2¼ .390 (adj)
Note: *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p< 0.001.
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R2¼ 0.411). The coefficients and significance levels of the various independent
variables are reported in Table 4. In summary, we can state that the hypotheses
regarding the impact of anxiety (negatively), peer pressure and interpersonal trust
are supported, whereas the hypothesis regarding the impact of institutional trust
on Chinese citizens’ adoption of Sina Weibo does not receive support.
Conclusion
The results presented in the previous section provide core components of a theory
that explains why Chinese citizens, living in an authoritarian governance regime,
adopt Sina Weibo to interact with the authorities. By doing so, it corroborates and
specifies the determinants of Chinese citizens’ adoption of microblogging that were
suggested in qualitative, small-n and more descriptive studies of microblogging in
China (Harwit, 2014; Schlaeger and Jiang, 2014; Sullivan, 2014). Taken together,
the analysis points to the relevance of an individual citizen’s immediate social
environment (think of expected behaviours that emerge from pressures from
one’s nearest and dearest, and beliefs in the trustworthy, benevolent behaviours
of government officials) in explaining Chinese citizens’ adoption of microblogging
to interact with the government. Adoption does not result from technological
opportunity alone; rather, smaller-network ties consisting of feelings of belonging
with relation to one’s nearest and dearest, as well as expectations of officials’
sincerity, do impact or at least enable an individual’s adoption of microblogging
in state–citizen relations. Larger-network ties (trust in institutions at large, such as
the CCP, executive organizations, the judicial system, the media, etc.) are not
associated with the adoption of microblogging. This finding underlines the impor-
tance of densely knit, pervasive social networks (guanxi) surrounding individual
citizens in explaining how Chinese citizens engage with authorities in citizen–state
interactions using new electronic communication channels.
A noteworthy feature of microblogging use in a Chinese authoritarian state
context is the potential of censorship and surveillance exercised by government
information officials and censors working at Internet service providers. Empirical
evidence shows that there is a variance in Chinese citizens’ reported levels of anx-
iety. Furthermore, as higher levels of anxiety are correlated with lower levels of use
intention, anxiety limits citizens’ adoption of microblogging. This finding under-
lines the impact of the Chinese authority’s surveillance and control activities on the
lives of individual Chinese citizens, and urges academics and social media practi-
tioners alike to reflect on how political context may affect technology use in state–
citizen relations in China, and arguably also in other contexts.
Limitations and research directions
The findings and subsequent discussions give rise to a number of directions for
future research. A first limitation concerns the possibilities of generalizing the
findings across the domain of the PRC. We have partly derived relevant variables
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(anxiety, peer pressure and a sociological and psychological notion of trust) from
the context of the authoritarian governance system that is characteristic of the dual
CCP–government structure that is prevalent in the whole of the PRC. In order to
control for possible larger cultural differences throughout the vast country of
China, we chose to develop and test hypotheses using data gathered in one (still
huge and populous) province: Hunan province. Given China’s omnipresent CCP–
government apparatus, it may be tempting to generalize findings across the whole
of China. However, there exists large socio-economic and ethnic diversity in China,
and since our theorizing concerns Chinese citizens’ online motives, behaviours and
perhaps implicit coping mechanisms, considerable discretion must be considered in
order to prevent generalizations based on statistical inferences only.
A second limitation has to do with the false attribution of findings to context. In
this article, we have used inspiration from existing accounts of microblogging in
China, adoption theories and psychological ideas to develop and subsequently test
hypotheses. Theorizing and testing enabled the conclusion that the pervasive net-
works described in other Chinese literatures as guanxi are relevant to explaining
the adoption of microblogging. There may be a rival explanation stating that dense
networks consisting of smaller-network ties are relevant for explaining microblog-
ging adoption and what digital state–citizen relations look like, both in various
authoritarian regimes and in consolidated democracies alike. Moreover, some
renditions of the UTAUT focusing on electronic government transactions feature
variables like peer pressure and trust, also suggesting a role for smaller-network ties
in explaining the adoption of technologies in state–citizen relations outside the
particular Chinese context.
A third limitation concerns the method, that is, the survey, that was used in this
particular study. It has been observed in the literature that along with many other
social science methods like interviewing and observations, surveys as a
social-scientific method are more challenging to administer in China than in other
contexts. Respondents are likely to be familiar with filling in surveys that are
administered by governments, and when invited to participate in a scientific study,
Chinese citizens are likely to let privacy concerns influence their responses. This is a
possible source of bias that could have occurred in the data set. Triangulation
through additional interviews could be considered as a means to notice and if
necessary correct for such bias, though it has been noted that researchers are
sometimes in the position of having to read tea leaves to ascertain what respondents
really believe (King et al., 2013), thereby introducing new forms of biases.
If we reflect on this particular study and take the limitations seriously, there are
avenues for further research that we would like to suggest. A first research direc-
tion is comparative research of the use of microblogging in various political
governance systems. This study has demonstrated the validity of constructs like
peer pressure, interpersonal trust and anxiety in an authoritarian governance
system like China. The conclusions from this study urge replication in other
contexts, such as Western liberal democracies or, for instance, in transitional
states in Eastern Europe, in order to come up with more robust, informative
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and realistic theories about how and why citizens use microblogging and other
forms of social media to interact with the government, and vice versa.
A second research direction has to do with the type of variables that this study has
identified as determinants of the adoption of microblogging in a political context. At
large, we see that ‘smaller-network ties’ and anxiety are important for understanding
why citizens use microblogs in a Chinese context. This finding urges e-government
researchers working with adoption models like UTAUT to focus on persuasive and
normative pressures as determinants of technologies in state–citizen relations, rather
than perhaps overly rational variables like performance expectancy and ease of use,
which the e-government adoption literature has arguably inherited from UTAUT’s
legacy in more generic technology adoption studies.
A third avenue for research is to elaborate the concept of trust in government.
E-government researchers have begun to include ‘trust’ in explanatory theories of
the adoption of all kinds of e-government technologies. This study has identified
various components of ‘trust’, and it could arguably be useful to furthermore
analyse the multilayered concept of trust in government, for instance, in terms
of beliefs relating to: (1) the competence and/or consideration of individual gov-
ernment officials; (2) executive organizations having appropriate procedures and
safeguards in place; and (3) checks and balances between executive, judicial and
legislative powers that enable the correction of administrative errors or abuse.
The results of this study, combined with the directions for research suggested
earlier, highlight how new technologies like microblogs enable specific discourses
and interactions in the state–citizen relations of authoritarian government regimes
and in liberal democracies, as well as eventually cross-fertilization between the
disciplines of political science, public administration and information systems.
These academic disciplines have been ignoring each other’s contribution to the
fascinating empirical field of microblogging and social media for far too long.
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